B1 Exogenous Productivity Growth
In the context of most environmental problems, the natural resource is degrading on the 0-tax trajectory. In our model of constant productivity and capital, the world becomes poorer and future generations have lower welfare on that trajectory. This Appendix introduces exogenous productivity growth in both sectors. Let a 0 be the growth rate of total factor productivity in manufacturing and b 0 the growth rate of e¢ ciency in output per unit ‡ow of the resource. Sectoral output is M t = e at (1 L t ) and F t = e bt L t x t :
The inequality a > 0 can also be interpreted as exogenous growth in the stock of capital. The extraction of the resource is still L t x t (not e bt L t x t ). This model of resource productivity growth implies that each extracted unit of the resource increases the supply of the resource-intensive commodity. If we think of the resource as being energy, the assumption means that the economy becomes less energy intensive. The assumption of exponential productivity growth simpli…es the discussion, but the next proposition also holds if the productivity parameters a and b decrease over time. The exponential productivity growth implies a growth factor of e (a b) (1 + r(T t ; x t )) for the price level and of e a for all other variables (w t , R t , and t ). For the following proposition we assume that 2 (0; 1) is constant and that there is no transfer between generations, i.e. = 0.
Proposition 7 A larger value of a b increases the stringency of the necessary and su¢ cient condition under which a small constant tax increases the welfare of the young.
Proof. Using a derivation parallel to that contained in the proof of proposition 4, we have
The second inequality is equivalent to
The left side of inequality (B.1) is decreasing in a b, so an increase in a b decreases the set of parameter values and initial conditions under which the inequality is satis…ed, i.e. the circumstances under which the young bene…t from the tax. Under proportional growth (a = b), the condition for the young to bene…t from the tax is the same as when a = b = 0. The welfare e¤ect of the tax, for the young, depends on the change in the price level. A ceteris paribus increase in a b increases the next period relative supply of the manufacturing good, thereby increasing the future relative price of the resource-intensive good, P t+1 . The higher price lowers the marginal utility of next period income, making it "less likely" that the young are willing to forgo income today in order to have higher income in the next period. For a > b, the young would require a higher transfer from the old in order to agree to the tax. If, however, the productivity in the resource sector grows much faster than in the manufacturing sector (b >> a), the young might support a tax even when the resource is shrinking on the 0-tax trajectory, and in the absence of a transfer.
B2 Future generations
Merely in order to avoid uninteresting complications, we assume that for future generations the tax is constant: T 0 = T 1 = T 2 :::. The life-time welfare of the next young generation is
Di¤erentiating this expression with respect to " gives dU y
Using the simpli…cations found in the proof of Proposition 4, (including R(0) = 0 and @P 1 @x 1 = P 1 x 1 1 ) the expression simpli…es to
Comparing this condition to inequality (A.27), we see that when the stock is degrading (i.e. r(0; x 0 ) < 0), a small tax is more likely to bene…t the next period's young generation compared to today's, which always loses in the absence of transfers. The di¤erence arises for two reasons: A lower stock increases the BAU growth rate, d r(0;xt) dxt = r < 0, so that the left side is less negative. The right side of the inequality above is negative. Therefore, the condition here is weaker than the condition in inequality (A.27). In fact, it is satis…ed for any initial stock value in the calibration used in Section 5.
B3 Nash Bargaining
Using equations (5) -(7), we de…ne the lifetime welfare of the two agents
the value of lifetime utility of the two agents when they impose a zero tax in the current period. Under a 0 tax, R = 0, so the current value of does not a¤ect the agents' lifetime welfare. ThereforeŨ o (x t ) andŨ y (x t ) do not depend on . They do, however, depend on the current value of x and of course they depend on the decision rules used in the future; they are functionals. The pair Ũ o (x t ) ;Ũ y (x t ) is the threat-point in the Nash bargaining game. Total surplus equals
The Nash bargaining solution maximizes the Nash product,
It is well known that when there are lump sum transfers ( is unconstrained) the bargaining solution maximizes surplus, which is equivalent to maximizing aggregate lifetime welfare, the maximand in equation (14). That maximand does not involve t . The choice of enables decisionmakers to make a lump sum transfer between generations. In this case, the transfer is chosen to split the surplus evenly between the two generations, implying:
Using the formulae for equilibrium and disagreement payo¤s and solving the last equation for t gives
The function appears in the de…nition of C, both explicitly and implicitly via the de…nition ofŨ y (x t ). Therefore, equation (B.2) is a functional in . We numerically approximate the …xed point to this equation, and to the functional equation that determines . If is constrained, and the constraint is binding, then it is no longer the case that aggregate surplus is split equally between the two generations. In that case, the equilibrium T t that maximizes the Nash product, does not maximize aggregate surplus.
B4 Numerics
We approximate (x t+1 ) and (x t+1 ; (x t+1 )) (x t+1 ) as polynomials in x t+1 , and …nd coe¢ cients of those polynomials so that the solution to
approximately equals (x t ). Appendix B3 explains the functional equation used to approximate in the Nash bargaining case. In the probabilistic voting model, is a known constant. We use 13-degree Chebyshev polynomials evaluated at 13 Chebyshev nodes on the [0:1; 0:9] interval. At each node the recursion de…ning (x t ; (x t )),
and the optimality condition
o (B.4) subject to x t+1 = (1 + r t (x t ; T t )) x t and T t = (x t ) must be satis…ed. If is endogenous, we additionally require that t =~ (x t ) = (x t ) with~ (x t ) as explained in Appendix B3.
Starting with an initial guess for the coe¢ cients of the approximations of ( ) and ( ) and, possibly, ( ), we evaluate the right side of equation (B.3) for at each node. Using these function values, we obtain new coe¢ cient values for the approximation of ( ). We then use the optimality condition (B.4) to …nd the values of ( ) at the nodes; we use those values to update the coe¢ cients for the approximation of ( ). For endogenous , the new coe¢ cients for ( ) and ( ) also allow the updating of the coe¢ cients for the approximation of ( ). We repeat this iteration until the coe¢ cients'relative di¤erence between iterations falls below 10 6 . See chapter 6 of Miranda and Fackler (2002) for details. 4) , respectively. These residuals equal 0 at the nodes, because we set both the degree of the polynomial and the number of nodes equal to n. We choose n = 13 to ensure that residuals are at least 5 orders of magnitudes below the solution values on the [0:1; 0:9] interval.
B5 Robustness checks
We computed two variations as a further robustness check. In the …rst variation, young agents select the current tax and receive all of the surplus, but have to compensate the old generation to ensure that the latter's welfare does not fall below a default level. This default level equals their welfare under the tax chosen in the previous period. The rationale for this model is that inertia favors the existing tax, and that young agents have to compensate the now-old agents to persuade them to change the tax that the latter chose when they were young. For this experiment we set = 1. We …nd that this variation results in a tax policy very close to, but slightly lower than the policy under the previous formulation with = 1. We conclude that our results are not sensitive to changes in or to moderate changes in the structure of the political economy model.
In the second variation, motivated by Proposition 5 and the comments following it, = 0. Here, the old in the …rst period to propose a transfer rate . Conditional on this choice, the old and the young each propose a constant tax. Due to inertia, society chooses the smaller of these two taxes. We then con…rmed numerically that this tax is time consistent. Future young generations would like to lower the tax and future old generations would like to increase it, but the welfare gain that either achieves is insu¢ cient to compensate the other. Therefore, no proposed change achieves consensus. The belief in the initial period that the tax will be constant is therefore con…rmed by the equilibrium. The steady state stock is about 2% higher than in the political economy framework (with = 0) and 10% lower than under the social planner.
